In Pursuit of Peace, Prosperity and Power – What ASEAN and EU can learn from each other? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 7, May 2014 by Hwee, Yeo Lay
Abstract 
The EU and ASEAN are often compared and seen as relatively successful regional organisations in their 
respective regions. Yet of late, both regional organisations are under intense scrutiny as they confront 
challenges posed by the financial crisis and rising geopolitical tensions. Their inability to respond effectively 
to these challenges has brought about a chorus of criticisms.  Noting the current tensions face by both the 
EU and ASEAN in their respective regions, one could not help but wonder how and if they would be able to 
deal with the increasing complex security landscape because of a weakened US, and the rise of the rest. 
This article will compare and contrast the approaches taken by the EU and ASEAN thus far in trying to build 
peace and prosperity, and how they manage the demands of power politics to distill some lessons on what 
they can learn from each other in order to navigate an increasingly paradoxical world of economic 
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The beginning of 2014 saw a flurry of articles in 
the media comparing the rising tensions in East 
Asia to the situation in Europe in 1914. The Prime 
Minister of Japan himself likened the tensions be-
tween Japan and China to the relationship be-
tween Germany as a rising power challenging 
Britain a century ago.  This received an immedi-
ate rebuke by China who preferred to frame its 
relations with Japan in the context of World War II 
in which China is the victim and Japan the ag-
gressor.  
 
In marking the 100 years since World War One 
erupted on the European continent, several 
scholars have called for cooler heads in East Asia 
and reflect on the lessons from 1914. A series of 
events beginning in 2011 – the so-called US “piv-
ot” to Asia, the increasing assertiveness of the 
Chinese in its territorial claims in the South China 
Sea and East Asia Sea, leading to tensions with 
Philippines, Vietnam and Japan, and the return of 
Shinzo Abe, a right wing politician, as the Prime 
Minister of Japan – led to increased shrillness in 
the rhetoric in the region. Tensions ratcheted up a 
notch when the Chinese unilaterally declared an 
air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over a large 
part of the East China Sea including the disputed 
islands (Diaoyu / Senkaku).  The US immediately 
challenged Chinese authority by flying a B52 
bomber into the zone unannounced.  
 
The cascading events and increasing tensions in 
East Asia led former Prime Minister of Australia to 
warn that the East Asian region “resembles a 21st 
century maritime redux of the Balkans a century 
ago – a tinderbox on water”.  Pundits began to 
cast their eyes on the Asia-Pacific as the next 
theatre of conflicts between the major powers.  
Who would have thought that just two months into 
2014, attention has now returned to Europe – the 
continent that has sparked two world wars.  
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Russian annexation of Crimea has been labeled 
as Europe’s biggest crisis in the 21st century. 
While most Western politicians and scholars were 
quick to put the blame for what happened in Cri-
mea on Putin’s revanchism, the fact that the Eu-
ropean Union was caught off-guard by the situa-
tion has also led to criticisms of a Union that got 
carried away by its own high-minded rhetoric and 
inability to face up to hard power and the rough 
and tumble geopolitics practiced by Putin. Some 
analysts such as Roderic Lyne of Chatham 
House said that there is a gaping hole in Europe-
an Security architecture – that there is no forum in 
which to negotiate quiet solutions to simmering 
issues before they boil over while others such as 
Asle Toje felt that the European diplomatic land-
scape is over-institutionalised.  
 
In responding to the heightened tensions in the 
Asia-Pacific in recent years, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have also 
been criticized for being ineffectual and failing to 
bring about a grand bargain between the major 
powers in the region.  The lack of formal institu-
tions for crisis management and inability to speak 
with one voice has often been singled out as one 
of the key weakness of ASEAN.  Yet, despite 
these criticisms, ASEAN has a grasp of the geo-
politics of the region, and actively sought to man-
age the tensions with lots of talk and plenty of 
meetings.  
 
Noting the current tensions faced by both the EU 
and ASEAN in their respective regions, one could 
not help but wonder how and if they would be 
able to deal with the increasing complex security 
landscape because of a weakened US, and the 
rise of the rest. The next section of this paper will 
compare and contrast the approaches taken by 
the EU and ASEAN thus far in trying to build 
peace and prosperity, and how they manage the 
demands of power politics to distill some lessons 
on what they can learn from each other in order to 
navigate an increasingly paradoxical world of 
economic interdependence but political fragmen-
tation. 
 
Peace, Prosperity and Power 
 
The EU as a peace project is a narrative that was 
rooted in the historical context of the 20th centu-
ry’s wars and has been widely accepted by the 
founding members of the European integration 
project. The raison d’etre of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was to reduce the 
risk of war among European states by encourag-
ing economic interdependence and having com-
mon oversight over coal and steel, the two       
industries underpinning military power in the 20th 
century.  
 
The success of the EU in delivering peace and 
reconciliation has also been widely acknowl-
edged, and as laid out in Schuman’s declaration, 
war is now unthinkable between member states 
of the EU.  Yet, while the EU has delivered on 
internal reconciliation and peace amongst its 
members, the broader peace and stability of the 
entire European continent, particularly during the 
Cold War period was underpinned by NATO and 
the American security umbrella. 
 
Seen in this light, the primary purpose of the EU 
in its “incarnation as the European Economic 
Community was to help foster economic prosperi-
ty in Europe”1. And the EU has succeeded in 
large measures to bring about higher economic 
growth and better standard of living by first bring-
ing down trade barriers, and then creating a sin-
                                               
1 Asle Toje. The European Union as a Small Power: 
After the Post-Cold War (UK:Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010) 
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gle market for goods, services, capital and peo-
ple.  Yet, again, economic integration while by far 
the most successful tenet of the EU also has its 
ups and down, and the single market is still a 
work in progress.  
 
It is in the area of power and “high politics” that 
there is some ambivalence and perhaps diver-
gence amongst member states with regards to 
the role of the EU. The ambition to act as a politi-
cal entity, a Union with a common foreign and se-
curity policy, was expressed more explicitly with 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.  While mem-
ber states such as France and the UK are com-
fortable talking about power and probably see the 
EU as an additional tool or instrument for them to 
bolster or project their power, there are some 
member states that are not as comfortable in 
openly displaying any power ambitions and deal-
ing with hard power. Hence, the EU has toyed 
with various concepts of power identifying itself 
first as civilian power and then normative power.  
 
However, in the area of foreign policy and diplo-
macy, the record of normative power Europe has 
been much checkered. The EU has been able to 
export its norms of democracy and respect for 
human rights to those countries that want to be-
come members of the EU, but have not delivered 
on intended outcomes in many of its near aboard 
– from the Southern Mediterranean to its eastern 
neighbourhood.  
 
Now let’s turn to the record of ASEAN in dealing 
with the issues related to the three Ps -peace, 
prosperity and power.   
 
ASEAN’s founding document the Bangkok Decla-
ration listed accelerating economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful com-
munity as one of its key objectives and aims. An-
other key aim is to promote regional peace and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule of law in the relationship among countries 
of the region and adherence of the principles of 
the UN Charter. 
 
Clearly, peace and prosperity was very much in 
the minds of the founding members of ASEAN. 
Yet, it was in dealing with power politics and the 
realities of the security situation in its region that 
ASEAN has recognized as the most important 
task for its members. Only when they get the poli-
tics right can there be a stable environment for 
growth and development.  
 
Mindful of its own weaknesses and cognizant of 
the power politics in the region, ASEAN has em-
phasized a set of norms – non-interference, sov-
ereign equality, respect for diversity and centrality 
of peace – in its relations with one another and 
with external powers.  For three decades, ASEAN 
cooperation was pursued through a series of po-
litical meetings based on consultation and con-
sensus and not by way of formal institutions. In-
stead of relying on treaties and binding agree-
ments, cooperation was based on political decla-
rations and agreements. 
 
Through careful navigation of the geopolitics in 
the region, and engaging in balance of power 
politics, ASEAN made a not so insignificant con-
tribution to the stability of the region. Hugh White 
argued that ASEAN was also lucky that after 
Richard Nixon met Mao Zedong in 1972, a new 
strategic and political order was established in 
which US primacy was not seriously contested in 
the region by any Asian power. This provided the 
foundation for a remarkable era of peace and 
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stability which in turn allowed the member states 
to focus their attention on economic development.  
 
The failure of the import substitution strategies 
pursued by some of the bigger ASEAN member 
states in the earlier years led to a more outward 
orientated export-driven economic model. The 
member states compete in attracting FDI and in 
their exports to the developed world.  Hence, un-
like the EU, the focus was not on regional eco-
nomic integration for prosperity. Instead it was 
being plugged into the global economy, and 
“open for business” that ASEAN countries main-
tained decent economic growth. There was no 
customs union and intra-ASEAN trade was low at 
around 20% compared to the EU’s over 60%.   
 
It was only in the 1990s with the increasing pace 
of globalization and competition that ASEAN be-
gan to take regional economic integration a bit 
more seriously. As regionalism picks up pace in 
other regions and market-driven regionalization 
becomes an increasing reality in Southeast Asia, 
ASEAN has to respond with some semblance of 
collaboration and coordination in the economic 
arena to remain attractive to foreign investors in 
the light of competition from China and other 
emerging markets. 
 
Such was the ambiguous role of ASEAN in con-
tributing to peace and prosperity in the region. 
Due to the lack of trust between the major powers 
in the region, ASEAN was also astute enough to 
carve a role for itself in the geopolitics of the 
broader Asia-Pacific region with a series of dia-
logue partnerships with all major powers in the 
region and with the launch of the ASEAN Region-
al Forum (ARF), and then the East Asia Summit 
and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting with its 
major partners, the so-called ADMM Plus.  
ASEAN tried to maintain a central role to shape 
the agenda in the various emerging architectures. 
However, its ability to do more is dependent on its 
own internal cohesion.   
 
Institutions and Interest 
 
In comparing the EU and ASEAN, it is clear that 
in terms of integration, particularly economic inte-
gration, the EU has gone the furthest. This inte-
gration is supported by a dense network of hard 
and soft institutions with “ever closer union” as its 
overarching goal. This network of institutions 
binds the member states in an indissoluble eco-
nomic interdependence that makes war between 
them unthinkable. The interests of the member 
states are carefully weighted, calibrated and bal-
anced in the network of institutions.  
 
In contrast, integration was never the original rai-
son d’etre of ASEAN. ASEAN was an instrument 
for member states to manage the mistrust and 
tensions amongst them and navigate the geopoli-
tics of its immediate environment. ASEAN’s co-
operation was more about achieving balance of 
power in an anarchical system. Traditional diplo-
macy was initially the tool of choice to manage 
the power politics but at the same time, ASEAN 
also slowly went beyond traditional diplomacy to 
put in place other soft institutions to build confi-
dence and reduce transaction costs.  
 
The EU believed that institutions can be built to 
temper power politics. Pooling sovereignty and 
supranational institutions was the EU response to 
ever closer union in the economic sphere.  For 
much of its first three decades, the EU was “inter-
nally driven”. The ambition to act fully as a Union 
when dealing with the rest of the world only came 
at the end of the Cold War with the launch of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
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In contrast, ASEAN has always been “externally 
focused”. In its first three decades, ASEAN acted 
together a few times to deal with the changing 
security environment – Nixon’s Guam doctrine, 
the triumph of the communist Vietnamese north 
over the capitalist south, and Vietnam’s invasion 
of Cambodia. It was only at the end of the Cold 
War with an increasingly competitive external 
economic environment that ASEAN took the first 
real step towards economic cooperation by 
agreeing to the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area. This was later upgraded to an ASEAN Eco-
nomic Community after the Asian financial crisis 
revealing further vulnerabilities and the need for 
ASEAN to coordinate more in the economic arena 
if it is to remain attractive to foreign investors in 
the light of other emerging economic behemoths 
like China and India. 
 
As the EU enlarged and deepened its economic 
integration, it has become a significant economic 
power in the global arena. Translating this to polit-
ical influence however has not been easy for the 
EU – hence the often heard remark that the EU is 
an economic giant but political pygmy.  
 
Why is this so? According to Toje, the EU is un-
derpinned by a complex and dynamic bargain 
among the member states and the common insti-
tutions and bolstered by a strong sense of com-
mon values. It has become wary of realpolitik and 
its successful enlargement to include several for-
mer Warsaw Pact Central and Eastern European 
countries had lulled the EU into believing that 
normative power Europe can effect change 
through example and promoting norms of human 
rights and democracy. It began to believe in its 
own rhetoric for a norms or value-based foreign 
policy failing to fully admit that power and inter-
ests lie at the heart of foreign policy.  
 
For ASEAN it was also only in the last decade 
that moving towards more institutionalization to 
build an ASEAN Community became a para-
mount objective. However, interests and realpoli-
tik continue to thwart efforts in community-
building and economic integration. Political decla-
rations and agreements have been made and 
signed, but translating them into binding institu-
tions have not been of utmost priorities for several 
member states.  ASEAN remained an inter-
governmental organization firmly grounded on the 
primacy of national interests – only when national 
interests and regional interests converged, con-
crete steps can be taken. 
 
The comparison of EU and ASEAN and their insti-
tutional structures brings us to an often over-
looked fact. As Moeller and Ewing-Chow noted 
“formalities cannot bend realities. Realities govern 
formalities follow. Formalities in the form of insti-
tutional structure cannot bring along agreements 
that do not follow from member states’ interests”2.  
With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU tries to tweak its 
institutions to make the EU a more coherent and 
cohesive actor on world stage.  Yet the truth is 
that the member states have chosen to retain the 
inter-governmental nature of decision making for 
its CFSP/CSDP. And when there is a clash be-
tween national interests of the 28 member states 
and European interests, the latter often loses out.  
At the same time, although decision-making by 
consensus limits policy outputs, CFSP has also 
brought about a cumulative body of common for-
eign and security policies characterised by com-
mon actions and joint actions, and a sea-change 
in the practice and ambience of foreign policy 
making. Bureaucratic politics rather than diploma-
                                               
2 Michael Ewing Chow and Joergen Orstroem Moeller.  
A Theory of ASEAN Integration (unpublished paper, 
2012) 
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cy has begun to shape and set the EU foreign 
policy and security agenda for better or for worse. 
 
ASEAN’s record in managing realpolitik may have 
seemed to be slightly better than the EU, but in 
recent years, it has also begun to show strains as 
the security landscape and geopolitics of the re-
gion become far more complex than during the 
Cold war era. The rise of China to become the 2nd 
largest economy in 2011 came at a time of declin-
ing US power and prestige following the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the global financial cri-
sis. We do not know how Sino-US relations would 
develop and whether increasing strategic rivalry 
between them would lead to fragmentation of 
ASEAN, but for ASEAN to remain to play any 
role, member states would have to think not only 
of national interests but regional interests and 
garner the political will to craft new institutions 





Regional cooperation is fundamentally related to 
the pursuit of three main goals – peace, prosperi-
ty and power. The varying degrees of intensity 
connected to these three goals differ across re-
gions and across time often informed by history, 
tradition and geography.  
 
The nature of European integration has changed 
over time – from being seen essentially as a 
peace project bringing about the reconciliation of 
France and Germany (the European Coal and 
Steel Community), to an instrument for economic 
prosperity (European Economic Community) and 
now an entity that is designed not only to manage 
economic interdependence and the challenges of 
globalisation but a regional actor trying to shape 
the external conditions through a web of govern-
ance structures (the European Union). 
 
Similarly, ASEAN has changed over time – from 
being essentially a mechanism by member states 
to keep communism and external interference in 
domestic politics at bay (the first decade), to col-
lective diplomacy to deal with regional stability 
and external threats to member states (mid 1970s 
to end of 1980s) to a more proactive engagement 
to manage political and security dialogue and the 
pursuit of closer economic cooperation in re-
sponse to globalisation and greater interdepend-
ence (from end of the Cold War). 
 
Comparing and contrasting how the EU and 
ASEAN approach issues of peace, prosperity and 
power, and defined interest and conceived institu-
tions in their regional cooperative or integrative 
efforts leads us to the following lessons: 
 
Always start with the why and what before we 
consider the how 
 
Why pursue regional integration and what are the 
objectives and goals? Only when there is at least 
some consideration and consensus on this that 
we can begin to decide on how to go about 
achieving the objectives – the type of institutions 
and processes that can help us towards our 
goals.  
 
Schuman and Monnet in drawing up the plan for a 
coal and steel community wanted nation states to 
break away from the old power politics and a 
complete transformation of the relations amongst 
countries in Europe. Hence the Treaty of Paris 
provided for a supranational institution, the High 
Authority to “take decisions in the name of shared 
European interests”, and also a Court to “oversee 
compliance with the Treaty”. Order and a firm 
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footing were underpinned by the Treaty, and the 
Community was made a legal entity represented 
inwardly and outwardly by the High Authority. 
 
In contrast, ASEAN only had a political declara-
tion (the Bangkok declaration) of a few pages 
mentioning broadly the desire for regional coop-
eration in order “to ensure stability and security 
from external interference in any form of manifes-
tation in order to preserve their national identities 
…”3.  There were no Secretariat, no High Authori-
ty but only an annual meeting of foreign ministers. 
The member states of ASEAN many of which 
young nations emerging from colonialism and in 
the process of building a national identity out of 
the disparate communities within borders drawn 
by the colonial masters could not but proclaimed 
the norm of sovereign equality and non-
interference as paramount. The ASEAN way is 
about consultation and consensus.  
 
Institutions matter but even more so, leader-
ship and political will 
 
While the High Authority (later to become the 
Commission) is an important institution, Franco-
German leadership was seen as the driving force 
behind European integration. The first crisis of the 
EU happened when Charles de Gaulle unhappy 
with the proposal by the Commission to introduce 
more qualified majority voting decided to boycott 
all the meetings. The so-called empty chair crisis 
meant that many decisions could not be taken, 
and the Community was “paralysed” until a politi-
cal solution was found and the Commission 
backed down on its proposal.  
 
ASEAN rely on traditional old-style diplomacy to 
address issues they face along the way and did 
not create any binding institutions in its initial 
                                               
3 The Bangkok Declaration (www.asean.org) 
years. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) in 1976 was still more of a political declara-
tion rather than legal text, and the ASEAN Secre-
tariat established in the same year functioned 
merely as a post box and logistical agency for 
managing meetings and events.  Yet despite the 
lack of binding institutions, ASEAN made modest 
progress whenever political will is garnered in the 
face of common threats. 
 
Whether it is the EU with its complex web of le-
gally binding institutions or institutions-lite 
ASEAN, ultimately leadership and political will are 
what really matters and the key engine behind 
any progress in regional cooperation or integra-
tion.  
 
Be mindful of power and interests 
 
Values, principles and law should matter and 
guide foreign and international relations, but ulti-
mately, power politics can never be ignored 
where sovereignty and national interests contin-
ued to reign.  Some people in the EU thought 
power politics can be replaced by technical wran-
gling over policies guided by legal norms and in-
stitutions. Yet the truth is that the dynamism of a 
union comes from a complex mix arising from 
“each nation’s pursuit of self-interest, order 
through membership, law and a balance of     
power”.4 
 
In the case of ASEAN, too much power politics 
remain at play. Although there are also norms 
and principles to govern this power play, there is 
a lack of the legal dimension that can force mem-
bers to sit down and discuss until interests are 
reconciled, and compromises made.  Yet it is also 
                                               
4 Luuk van Middelaar The Passage to Europe: How a 
Continent became a Union (US: Yale University Press, 
2013) 
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because ASEAN is painfully aware of the reality 
of power and interests in the geopolitics of the 
region that has allowed it to play the role of inter-
locutor, and offered a platform where all major 
powers meet.  Yet, this role is not assured espe-
cially as the security and political landscape be-
come more complex. Only an ASEAN that can 
reconcile its own internal contradicting interests 
and a more economically integrated ASEAN 
could have the power to retain a central role in 




The crisis in Ukraine / Crimea and the rising ten-
sions in the South and East China Seas have 
thrown the spotlight on the EU and ASEAN. Are 
they equipped with the political acumen to deal 
with uncertainties and ambiguities and able to 
comprehend the links between the past, present 
and future? As van Middelaar argued in his book 
“The Passage to Europe”, “politics can transform 
raw reality into new facts…. Historical reality is 
fundamentally unpredictable. Unintended conse-
quences of human acts, unexpected chain of re-
action, hasty decisions – such things make the 
future infinitely uncertain. No plan or treaty can 
predict the full creativity of history, let alone lay 
down adequate answers in advance.…”5  How 
the EU and ASEAN manage the geopolitical reali-
ties in their backyard will depend on political will 
and acumen, and when a crisis hit, it is better to 
be agile and flexible and rely on a general sense 
of direction rather than on hard and fast rules.  
                                               
5 Luuk van Middelaar The Passage to Europe: How a 
Continent became a Union (US: Yale University Press, 
2013) 
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